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LIBEL-NEW STANDARD OF LIABILITY FOR MEDIA DEFENDANTS-Tas-
kett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wn. 2d 439,546 P.2d 81 (1976).
William Taskett's advertising business had suffered serious financial
setbacks which caused him to seek statutory corporate dissolution.
Believing that his affairs had been put in order, he left the state for an
extended vacation.' Because his whereabouts were unknown to his un-
satisfied creditors, which included several prominent Seattle businesses,
KING Broadcasting Company decided that his "disappearance" was
newsworthy, 2 and made it the subject of a television news story.
Taskett brought suit against KING for libel, alleging that its story
had depicted him as a "thief and a swindler." Relying upon the con-
trolling Washington authority of Miller v. Argus Publishing Co.,3 the
trial court granted KING a summary judgment dismissing the action.
Miller recognized a conditional privilege for publishers and broad-
casters in defamation actions arising-out of any publication involving
a matter of public interest, which could be defeated only by a showing
that the defendant had published with "actual malice." 4
Taskett appealed. Relying upon the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,5 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court reversed.6 Held: When a publication concerns
a subject of public interest and the substance makes the danger to
reputation apparent, a private individual may recover in a defamation
action against a publisher or broadcaster only upon a showing that the
defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, that the publication was false or would create-a materially
false impression. 7 If the plaintiff cannot show "actual malice," how-
l. 86 Wn. 2d 439, 440-41,546 P.2d 81, 82-83 (1976).
2. Brief for Respondents at 6, Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wn. 2d 439,
546 P.2d 81 (1976). The trial court found that the story related to a matter of gen-
eral public concern. Id. at 441-42, 546 P.2d at 83.
3. 79Wn. 2d816,490P.2d I01 (1971).
4. Id. at 827,490 P.2d at 109.
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz allowed the states considerable latitude to reduce
the protection for the media defendant which had previously been held required by
the Constitution. Id. at 347. Although Gertz had been decided by the time of the trial
court decision in Taskett, that court believed that Miller was controlling, and stated
that any change in the law would have to come from the state supreme court. Taskett
v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wn. 2d at 441-42, 546 P.2d at 83.
6. 86 Wn. 2d at 450, 546 P.2d at 88. The case had been certified directly to the
Washington Supreme Court by the court of appeals. Id. at 442, 546 P.2d at 83.
7. Id. at 445, 546 P.2d at 85.
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ever, recovery will be limited to actual damages. 8 Taskett v. KING
Broadcasting Co., 86 Wn. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
With Taskett, the Washington Supreme Court has reduced from
"actual malice" to "negligence" the degree of fault which must be
shown in order to defeat a publisher's or broadcaster's constitutional
privilege in most defamation actions brought by a private individual.
The Taskett privilege is nonetheless based upon the same constitu-
tional considerations which led to the adoption of the "malice" stan-
dard in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.9 Cases which apply the new
Taskett standard should therefore be governed by the procedural safe-
guards which are an integral part of the New York Times standard.
The Taskett holding is expressly limited to cases in which the sub-
ject of the publication involves a matter of public interest. However,
because Gertz, which established the constitutional foundation for
Taskett, extends the protection of the constitutional privilege to any
defamation regardless of the subject matter, the limitation is inap-
posite. There may no longer be strict liability in defamation imposed
against a publisher or broadcaster.
Taskett limits plaintiff's recovery to "actual damages" when a de-
gree of fault less than "actual malice" is shown. A subsequent Wash-
ington case holds that "actual damages" will not be narrowly con-
strued.10
I. THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN WASHINGTON
In Washington, as in most other states, common law defamation
was a strict liability tort which could be defeated only by the defenses
of truth, consent, or absolute or conditional privilege.1' In 1964, the
United States Supreme Court decided New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
8. Id. at 447, 546 P.2d at 86.
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wn. 2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041 (1976).
11. Jolly v. Fossum, 63 Wn. 2d 537, 388 P.2d 139 (1964). See, e.g., Gold Seal
Chinchillas, Inc. v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 828, 420 P.2d 698 (1966) (absolute privilege);
Owens v. Scott Publishing Co., 46 Wn. 2d 666, 284 P.2d 296 (1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 968 (1956) (conditional privilege). "Fair comment," although sometimes
treated as an independent defense, Jolly v. Fossum, 63 Wn. 2d 537, 541, 388 P.2d 139,
141 (1964), is considered a species of conditional privilege. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles
Publishing Co., 45 Wn. 2d 262, 273 P.2d 893 (1954) (fair comment), W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 111-116 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Comment,
An Outline of the Law of Libel in Washington, 30 WASH. L. REV. 36, 40-45 (1955).
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van,12 the first of a line of cases which were to profoundly alter the
common law of defamation. New York Times recognized that strict
liability in defamation actions has a "chilling effect"' 3 upon the exer-
cise of freedoms which are guaranteed by the first amendment. The
Court held that in defamation actions brought by public officials for
falsehoods relating to their official conduct, the Constitution requires
that publishers' 4 be protected by a privilege which may be defeated
only upon a showing that the defamatory statemenit was made with
"actual malice"; that is, "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 5 The New York
Times privilege was subsequently extended in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts16 to apply to cases in which the defamed individual was merely
a "public figure."'1 7 Washington recognized the constitutional privilege
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times involved a suit brought by an Ala-
bama city commissioner over a paid advertisement which connected him with the
maltreatment of black students.
13. Defense of any defamation claim involves both economic and non-economic
costs. The most obvious costs are the cost of defense, and, if unsuccessful, the damage
award; in lieu of these a defendant may agree to a settlement cost. Less easily re-
duced to economic terms are the damages to a publisher's professional reputation,
regardless of who prevails. In order to avoid these costs, a "rational" publisher will
tend to avoid publishing material which is likely to give rise to law suits, hence the
"chilling effect" upon first amendment freedoms.
The degree of this "chilling effect" is related to the probability that given conduct
will give rise to a law suit, and to the probability that the publisher will lose. When
the publisher is held to a standard of strict liability, suits are both more likely to be
brought and more likely to be successful. The strict liability standard, therefore, has
the greatest "chilling effect." See generally Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship,
53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 430-38 (1975). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. See note 29 infra.
15. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
16. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Butts involved an action brought by a well known col-
lege football coach and athletic director over a story appearing in the Saturday
Evening Post which charged him with "fixing" a football game. A companion case,
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), involved an action brought by a
retired general over a news account distributed by the Associated Press wire service
describing his involvement in a racial disturbance.
17. Id. at 155. In determining the "public figure" character of a plaintiff, the
Court looked to "ordinary tort rules." It concluded that the two plaintiffs in Butts and
Walker were both "public figures" because they both "commanded a substantial
amount of independent public interest at the time of the publications." One plaintiff
attained that status by "position alone," as a nationally prominent football coach, the
other "by his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the
'vortex' of an important public controversy." Id. at 154-55.
The necessity of determining whether or not a plaintiff is a "public figure" was
made temporarily moot by Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971),
where a plurality held that the character of the plaintiff was no longer decisive. This
position was reconsidered three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974), where the character of the plaintiff was once again held to be constitu-
tionally critical. See note 28 infra.
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in defamation actions brought by public officials or public figures in
Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co. 18
In 1971, the Supreme Court extended the New York Times privi-
lege even further in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.19 Reasoning
that the privilege is conferred to protect all debate on public issues,
the Court held, but only by a plurality,20 that a publisher or
broadcaster 2 ' is protected by the New York Times privilege whenever
the subject of the publication involves a matter of public or general
interest, even if the defamed person is a purely private individual.
22
Washington adopted the Rosenbloom rule in Miller v. Argus Publish-
ing Co.2 3 that same year.
Rosenbloom was decided with considerable dissension within the
Supreme Court,24 and some Justices were concerned that the Court had
not made its position on defamation absolutely clear.25 For this rea-
son, the Court reconsidered the Rosenbloom holding in Gertz,2 6 and
18. 72 Wn. 2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1967). Grayson involved an action brought by
a former University of Washington basketball coach over an article which had ap-
peared in the Saturday Evening Post charging that he lacked good sportsmanship.
19. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Rosenbloom involved an action brought by a distributor
of nudist magazines against a Philadelphia radio station which had reported that he
sold "obscene" literature, and accused him of improperly pressuring public officials
and news media to "lay off the smut racket." Id. at 33-34.
20. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun. Separate concurring opinions were written by Justices Black
and White. Separate dissenting opinions were written by Justice Marshall with Justice
Stewart joining, and by Justice Harlan. See note 24 infra.
21. See note 29 infra.
22. 403 U.S. at 43-44.
23. 79 Wn. 2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971). Miller involved an action brought by a
public relations consultant who had been employed by several political candidates.
He sued over a story which suggested that he supported "right wing" candidates and
that his expensive political campaigns were ineffective. Id. at 818-19, 490 P.2d at 104.
24. The Supreme Court later said of its Rosenbloom decision:
[N] o majority could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices who par-
ticipated in Rosenbloom announced their views in five separate opinions, none of
which commanded more than three votes. The several statements not only reveal
disagreement about the appropriate result in that case; they also reflect divergent
traditions of thought about the general problem of reconciling the law of defama-
tion with the First Amendment.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 333 (1974) (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 353-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun cast the vote
which made Gertz a majority decision. Although Gertz abandoned the reasoning
which he preferred, and for which he voted with the lead opinion in Rosenbloom, he
strongly believed it to be "of profound importance for the Court to come to rest in
the defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority position that eliminates
the unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity." Id. at 354.
26. 418 U.S. at 323. Gertz involved a prominent Chicago attorney who rep-
resented a murder victim's family in a civil action against the slayer, a police officer.
In an article appearing in American Opinion, a John Birch Society publication, Gertz
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concluded that a state's interest in protecting the reputation of one of
its citizens is greater if he is a private individual than if he is a public
official or public figure.27 It held that when the plaintiff is a purely
private individual,2 8 each state may choose for itself any standard of
liability which it deems appropriate for the publisher or broadcaster
defendant, 29 so long as it does not impose liability without fault.30
was portrayed as a communist and accused of "framing" the police officer. The Court
concluded that in his capacity as an attorney, Gertz was neither a public official nor a
public figure.
27. Id. at 342-45.
28. A "private individual" may be distinguished from a public official or a "public
figure." A person may be a "private individual" for some purposes, but a "public figure"
for others. In Gertz the Court said:
[The] designation [as a public figure] may rest on either of two alternative bases.
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety
that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More com-
monly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of is-
sues. In either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of
public questions.
418 U.S. at 351. See note 17 supra.
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the plaintiff and her husband, a
famous industrialist, were involved in a contested and highly publicized divorce pro-
ceeding. Time magazine reported that the divorce was granted on the basis of the
wife's cruelty and adultery, when in fact the final judgment was ambiguous and did
not specify grounds. The wife sued Time for libel. The question of her public charac-
ter was appealed to the Supreme Court. The majority concluded that she was not a
public figure, reasoning that a marriage dissolution is not the kind of public controversy
contemplated by Gertz, in which the Court defined a public figure as one who assumes
a role of special prominence or thrusts himself into a particular public controversy.
id. at 454.
29. The Netv York Times privilege, as originally announced and as extended by
Butts, did not precisely define the type of defendant to whom the rule applied. The
privilege has generally been applied to both media and non-media defendants. Com-
ment, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media and
Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 902, 903 (1974). In the more recent ex-
tensions of the constitutional privilege, however, the Supreme Court has been more
explicit about the contemplated defendant. In both Rosenbloom and Gertz, the Court
used language which identified the objects of the privilege as "publishers and broad-
casters." At least on its facts, Gertz is limited to media defendants.
The view of many legal commentators is that the reasoning of Gertz is applicable
to any defendant. They consider it inevitable that the Gertz abolition of strict liability
in defamation will be expanded, either by the Supreme Court or by the state courts,
to include any defendant. At least one state court has done so already. Jacron Sales
Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688, 695-96 (1976). See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 580B, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). See also Anderson,
supra note 13, at 442 n.95; Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349,
1416-17 (1975); Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan To Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc. And Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 471, 507-11
(1975).
30. 418 U.S. at 347. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Supreme
Court held that when it abolished liability without fault, it did not limit the ability of
the states to determine how or where fault must be found, so long as it is found by an
979
Washington Law Review Vol. 52: 975, 1977
II. THE TASKETT STANDARD
Taskett presented the Washington Supreme Court with its first
opportunity3' to exercise the discretion allowed to the states by
Gertz.32 The court held that a media defendant 33 is privileged only so
long as it exercises "reasonable care" in publishing, 34 at least when
the defamatory potential of the publication is apparent. 35 A plaintiff
express determination. Fault may be found by any competent finder of fact-a jury, a
trial court, or an appellate court. Id. at 461-63.
31. Childress v. Hearst Corp., 86 Wn. 2d 486, 546 P.2d 108 (1976), decided im-
mediately following Taskett, raised identical questions. Taskett was deemed to be
controlling, and the case was decided without additional reasoning.
32. Gertz held that "the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broacaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a pri-
vate individual." 418 U.S. at 347.
33. The holding of Taskett is limited to defamation by "media" defendants. 86
Wn. 2d at 447, 546 P.2d at 86. This limitation, however, may eventually prove to be
overly restrictive. See note 29 supra. Nonetheless, the remaining discussion in this note
will be limited to application of the Taskett rule to media defamations.
34. In adopting the "reasonable care" standard, Washington is among the clear
majority of states which have considered the question of liability involving a private
individual plaintiff since the Supreme Court's holding in Gertz. To date the choice
has been considered in twenty states. Thirteen have opted for a "negligence" test, or
some other standard of fault less than "actual malice." Corbett v. Register Publishing
Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (1975); Helton v. United Press Int'l, 303 So. 2d
650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw.
552, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 I11. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292
(1976); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Jacron
Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County
Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dis-
patch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975); Walters v.
Sanford Herald, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 233, 228 S.E.2d 766 (1976); Thomas H. Malon-
ey & Sons v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976);
Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 1160 (1977); Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wn. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81
(1976).
Four states have opted for the "actual malice" test originally announced in Rosen-
bloom. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 547 P.2d 1074
(1976); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest
Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913
(1976); Le Boeuf v. Times Picayune Publishing Co., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. Ct. App.
1976).
Three states have expressly reserved judgment on the question. McCarney v. Des
Moines Register and Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1976); Barbetta Agency,
Inc. v. Evening News Publishng Co., 135 NJ. Super. 214, 343 A.2d 105 (1975);
Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 224 S.E.2d 132 (1976).
35. 86 Wn. 2d at 445, 546 P.2d at 85. The limitation to situations in which the
defamatory potential of the publication is apparent echoes the limitation in Gertz.
Where the defamatory potential is not apparent, the Supreme Court expressly with-
held judgment as to the proper constitutional standard, saying only that different
considerations would be involved. 418 U.S. at 348. Justice White believed that the
Court was implying that where danger to reputation is not apparent the New York
Tines "actual malice" standard will apply. Id. at 389 n.27 (White, J., dissenting).
980
Media Liability for Libel
who prevails upon the minimum showing36 of lack of reasonable care
may recover only actual damages. In order to recover presumed dam-
ages, actual malice must be shown. Punitive damages are never re-
coverable.37
The remaining discussion will be devoted to four issues which
should prove to be important in the development and application of
the new Taskett standard. First, although Taskett announces a new
principle of law for Washington, it shares a common origin and pur-
pose with the well developed principles of New& York Times, and these
should guide the development of the Taskett rule. Second, the consti-
tutional concerns which demanded the incorporation of certain proce-
dural safeguards into the New York Times privilege are equally com-
pelling in cases subject to the Taskett rule, and these safeguards
should be incorporated into it as well. Third, because Gertz abolished
strict liability in defamation, at least when the defendant is a pub-
lisher or broadcaster, any inference that the constitutional privilege
recognized by Taskett is limited to cases which involve matters of
public interest is incorrect. Fourth, although a plaintiff's award under
a finding of lack of "reasonable care" is limited to "actual damages,"
this measure of damages will probably not be narrowly construed.
A. A Constitutional Standard
Because the Gertz minimum constitutional standard has gained
widespread identity as one of "negligence,"38 it is not surprising that
36. The court's language in Taskett evidenced its clear intent to provide only the
minimum privilege for the media required by Gertz. The court said: "[T] he test
which we have adopted merely represents a return to our pre-New York Times rule
[of strict liability], insofar as Gertz permits." 86 Wn. 2d at 448, 546 P.2d at 87.
In adopting a rule which turns on the character of the plaintiff, the Washington
court embraced the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in Gertz-that the Consti-
tution allowed the states to distinguish among classes of plaintiffs. First, public officials
and public figures usually have better access to channels of communication and have
a more realistic opportunity to correct falsehoods. Second, the state's interest in pro-
tecting private individuals is greater than it is for public officials and public figures
because the latter two groups willingly expose themselves to public scrutiny, thereby
relinquishing some of their interest in protecting their reputations. 86 Wn. 2d at 445-
46, 546 P.2d at 85. See note 28 supra.
37. Because Washington does not allow the award of punitive damages under any
circumstances, it is in this respect more protective of publishers than Gertz requires.
See note 67 infra.
38. The standard was characterized as "negligence" by members of the Court in
Gertz itself. 418 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 355 (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting); id. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 376 (White, J., dissenting). The
position that the standard is one of negligence is taken by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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the Taskett standard has been similarly characterized. 39 Although
Taskett "negligence" and common law negligence are in some respects
similar, they are nonetheless fundamentally different legal principles.
At common law, negligence is a separate tort which has evolved as an
independent basis of liability in order to make available a cause of
action for injuries that are caused unintentionally. 40 In contrast, the
Taskett "reasonable care" or "negligence" standard imposes a limita-
tion upon immunity from liability, a privilege which is constitutionally
conferred in order to safeguard first amendment freedoms. This con-
stitutional standard has no historical common law antecedent. 41
The Taskett "negligence" standard, like the Gertz minimum stan-
dard, is analogous to the "actual malice" standard of New York
Times. Both are intended to reconcile the "tension [which] neces-
sarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and
the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury." 42 The different
degrees of fault tolerated by Times and Gertz simply reflect the notion
that the state's interest in protecting reputation is greater with private
individuals than with public officials or public figures. 43 In all other
respects, the standards are the same, and this identity should be ac-
knowledged as the doctrine of Taskett "negligence" evolves.
B. Procedural Safeguards
Procedural as well as substantive rules clearly have a significant
impact upon the "chilling effect" of a potential defamation action.44
OF TORTS § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). See generally Anderson, supra note 13,
at 456; Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1426 (1975); Comment,
Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Impact on State
Law and the First Amendment, 69 Nw. L. REV. 960, 970 (1975).
39. The court in Taskett said that it adopted "negligence criteria." 86 Wn. 2d at
449, 546 P.2d at 87. Justice Horowitz, in his dissent, referred to the test as a "negli-
gence standard." Id. at 476, 546 P.2d at 103.
40. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 28 (4th ed. 1971).
41. In Gertz Chief Justice Burger wrote: "I do not know the parameters of a
negligence doctrine as applied to the news media .... [We] embark on a new doc-
trinal theory which has no jurisprudential ancestry." 418 U.S. at 355 (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting).
42. 418 U.S. at 342.
43. The Court concluded that "the state interest in compensating injury to the
reputation of private individuals requires a different rule." Id. at 343. The reason that
the Court believed that the distinction can and should be made is discussed at note
28 supra.
44. Some important elements of the "chilling effect" are discussed at note 13
supra.
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Procedural rules influence both the probability that liability will be
imposed,45 and the direct cost of litigation. 46 In New York Times, the
Supreme Court recognized that constitutionally protected conduct is
discouraged by fear of defamation damage awards, 47 and it an-
nounced both substantive48 -and procedural rules to reduce this
"chilling effect." The Times Court held that the Constitution demands
that a plaintiff show "actual malice" with "convincing clarity, '49 and
that because an ultimate finding for the plaintiff involves a constitu-
tional question, it is subject to de novo review throughout the appel-
late process. 50
45. For example, a summary judgment precludes any subsequent possibility that
a jury might find the defendant liable. The burden of proof imposed on a plaintiff will
influence the likelihood of his prevailing with given evidence (e.g., a burden of "con-
vincing clarity" is more difficult to carry than a burden of "preponderance of the evi-
dence"). A rule that only a judgment against the defendant may be appealed de novo
increases the number of opportunities for the defendant to prevail.
46. Summary judgment will of course eliminate the sometimes substantial cost of
the actual trial.
47. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
48. The substantive rule announced by the Court in New York Times is that the
Constitution confers a privilege requiring proof of "actual malice." Id. at 283.
49. The Supreme Court held that the "constitutional standard demands" that proof
be presented to show "actual malice" with "convincing clarity." Id. at 285-86. In Gertz,
the burden is restated as "clear and convincing proof." 418 U.S. at 342.
"Convincing clarity," "clear and convincing proof," "clear, cogent and convincing
proof," or other combinations of these terms are generally used to indicate the same
degree of proof. "Clear and convincing proof" has been held to mean that measure
or degree of proof which will produce a firm belief or conviction; more than by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Hobson v.
Eaton, 399 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Cross v.
Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954); Cromwell v. Hosbrook, 81 S.D.
324, 134 N.W.2d 777 (1965); Fred C. Walker Agency, Inc. v. Lucas, 215 Va. 535,
211 S.E.2d 88 (1975). Washington courts have held "clear, cogent and convincing"
proof to be greater than a preponderance, but less than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wn. 2d 150, 385 P.2d 727 (1963); Cheesman v. Sathre, 45 Wn.
2d 193, 273 P.2d 500 (1954).
The reason that the Constitution requires this higher standard of proof was dis-
cussed in Gertz, in which Justice Brennan quoted from Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc. as follows:
"In the normal civil suit where [the preponderance of the evidence] standard is
employed, 'we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous
verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the
plaintiff's favor.' In libel cases, however, we view an erroneous verdict for the
plaintiff as most serious. Not only does it mulct the defendant for an innocent
misstatement. . . but the possibility of such error, even beyond the vagueness of
the negligence standard itself, would create a strong impetus toward self-censor-
ship, which the First Amendment cannot tolerate." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50.
418 U.S. at 366-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
50. The Supreme Court wrote: "We must 'make an independent examination of
the whole record,' so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." 376 U.S. at 285. See Edwards v.
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In defamation actions involving a constitutional standard, the
Washington Supreme Court has expressly adopted both of these pro-
cedural safeguards-burden of proof of "convincing clarity"51 and de
novo appellate review. 52 In addition, it has held that because the mere
prospect of a full trial has a chilling effect upon protected activity,
summary judgment is proper to dispose of the question of "actual mal-
ice" in libel actions.53
In Taskett, the court mandated examination of the facts at the
summary judgment stage,54 but addressed neither the question of
burden of proof nor appellate review. It did expressly state, however,
that it was overruling Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., which incorpo-
rated both of these procedural safeguards,55 only to the extent that
Miller was inconsistent. 56 Because the essential inconsistency between
Taskett and Miller lay in the standard of liability, and not in any pro-
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
335 (1946).
51. Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wn. 2d 37, 41, 515 P.2d 154, 156 (1973);
Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wn. 2d 816, 827, 490 P.2d 101, 109 (1971). The
burden of "convincing clarity" was implicit in Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co.. 72
Wn. 2d 999, 1008, 436 P.2d 756, 762 (1968) in which the court held that the ques-
tion of actual malice must be "litigated under New York Times standards." Id.
52. Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wn. 2d 816. 829, 490 P.2d 101, 110(1971).
See also Mellor v. Scott Publishing Co., 10 Wn. App. 645, 657, 519 P.2d 1010. 1018
(1974).
53. Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wn. 2d 37, 43, 515 P.2d 154, 157 (1973).
The reason for examination of the facts at the summary judgment stage of the pro-
ceeding was discussed in Tait v. KING Broadcasting Co., I Wn. App. 250. 255. 460
P.2d 307, 311 (1969):
Our court has been conservative in granting summary judgment where the
issues involve [questions such as] negligence. These issues do not normally in-
volve, however, the pursuit of constitutionally protected practices.
Serious problems regarding the exercise of free speech and free press guaran-
teed by the First Amendment are raised if unwarranted lawsuits are allowed to
proceed to trial. The chilling effect of the pendency of such litigation can itself
be sufficient to curtail the exercise of these freedoms....
It would seem to us these considerations are of sufficient concern to compel
the court to carefully review the record in motions for summary judgment in
libel cases involving the exercise of First Amendment guarantees and, at that
stage, determine whether there is substantial evidence presented which, if be-
lieved, could persuade a jury with convincing clarity the defendant was guilty
of [actual malice].
In Chase the Washington Supreme Court modified the Tait rule, and stated that plain-
tiffs are not required to present "substantial" evidence, so long as the evidence is
sufficient for "convincing clarity." 83 Wn. 2d at 43 n.3, 515 P.2d at 158 n.3. See also
Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 865 (5th Cir. 1970); Time. Inc. v.
McLaney. 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969).
54. 86 Wn. 2d at 450, 546 P.2d at 88.
55. 79 Wn. 2d at 827, 490 P.2d at 109 ("convincing clarity"); id. at 829. 490
P.2d at 110 (de novo review).
56. 86 Wn. 2d at 447, 546 P.2d at 86.
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cedural matters, it may be inferred that the Taskett court contem-
plated application of the full panoply of these procedural safe-
guards, 57 even as it adopted the lesser constitutional standard. 58
C. No Subject Matter Limitation
The Taskett "reasonable care" standard should apply to any defa-
mation regardless of the subject matter of the publication, despite lan-
guage in the opinion which limits it to cases which involve the publi-
cation of "matters of general or public interest."59 The Washington
57. Although there is no direct precedent in Washington law, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a further procedural require-
ment may be necessary to satisfy the Constitution. The court of appeals required
that a plaintiff's pleadings must state allegations which are more specific than usual:
"[I] n any case. . . [based upon] conduct which is prima facie protected by the First
Amendment, the danger that the mere pendency of the action will chill the exercise
of First Amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise be
required." Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive
Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1976).
58. This inference is apparently not obvious, at least as it relates to the burden
of proof. For example, Justice Horowitz assumed that the burden will be "prepon-
derance" because that is the burden "in negligence cases," 86 Wn. 2d at 477, 546 P.2d
at 104 (Horowitz, J., dissenting), and Justice Brennan expressed the same view in
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 366-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting), but both Justices were clearly
hostile toward the lesser fault standard. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
580B, comment i (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975) also takes the view that the burden will
be "preponderance."
An interesting problem would be presented if the lesser burden were adopted.
In order to win presumed damages, a plaintiff must prove "actual malice." See text
accompanying notes 66-67 infra. It would be confusing to instruct a jury that it may
find "negligence" and award actual damages upon a showing of a "preponderance of
the evidence," but in order to award presumed damages it must find "actual malice"
by a showing of "convincing clarity."
The Supreme Court has not spoken to the question of whether the New York
Times procedural safeguards are a necessary part of Gertz. Therefore, it is not clear
that Washington is constitutionally required to incorporate them into the Taskett rule.
Nevertheless, the reasons which compelled their ificorporation into the New York Times
privilege seem at least as compelling in the Gertz setting. Indeed, because the lesser
fault requirement will probably result in more actions, there may be a greater risk of
errors which will offend the Constitution and more need for procedural protections.
That the Constitution mandates a lesser standard of fault should not imply that less
protective procedural safeguards are permissible.
59. 86 Wn. 2d at 445, 546 P.2d at 85. In litigation under the Rosenbloom rule,
in which the public interest character of the publication determined whether the
standard of fault would be "actual malice" or strict liability, the overwhelming ma-
jority of publications considered were adjudged to be of public interest. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 377 n.10 (White, J., dissenting); Frakt, The Evolv-
ing Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan To Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUT-CAM. L.J. 471, 478-79 (1975); Comment, The Expanding
Constitutional Protection for the News Media from Liability for Defamation: Predic-
ability and the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1547, 1562 (1972). It seems, there-
fore, that in the large majority of cases, the significance of uniform application of the
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Supreme Court erred in attributing a subject matter limitation to the
basic Gertz holding that the states may not impose liability without
fault.60 Such an interpretation is contrary to the widely accepted view
that the Gertz minimum constitutional privilege applies uniformly to
all cases of media defamation of a private individual. 61 Indeed, it was
primarily a fundamental disaffection for any "public interest" test
which induced the Supreme Court to reconsider and repudiate the
Rosenbloom test.62 In a later case, Time, Inc. v. Firestone,63 the Su-
"reasonable care" standard would be the practical benefit to be derived from avoiding
litigation of the question. For example, under the reasonable care standard a sum-
mary judgment never need be denied because a question remains as to the character
of the subject matter of the publication.
60. In its discussion of Gertz, the court in Taskett said, "IT] he holding ...per-
mitted each state to establish its own standard for libel actions brought by private
individuals over stories relating to matters of public concern." 86 Wn. 2d at 441, 546
P.2d at 83 (emphasis added). Gertz was neither qualified nor limited in its application
by any subject matter consideration. See 418 U.S. at 347-48. The critical parameters
of the Gertz privilege are the character of the plaintiff (see note 28 supra), the
character of the defendant (see note 29 supra), and the apparentness of the defama-
tory potential of the publication (see note 35 supra).
61. Support for the position that the Gertz holding is not limited to publications
which involve matters of public interest may be found in cases, commentaries, and
treatises. Justice White said in Gertz:
The impact of today's decision on the traditional law of libel is immediately
obvious and indisputable. No longer will the plaintiff be able to rest his case with
proof of a libel .... In addition, he must prove some further degree of culpable
conduct on the part of the publisher, such as intentional or reckless falsehood
[in the case of a public official or public figure], or negligence [in the case of a
private individual].
418 U.S. at 375-76 (White, J., dissenting). At least one state court has expressly
reached this conclusion. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688
(1976). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, comment e (Tent. Draft No.
21. 1975). See generally Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV.
422, 424 (1975); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 200 (1976); Comment, De-
fanation-Extent of Constitutional Privilege Afforded Inaccurate Reports of Judicial
Proceedings and Status of Participants Therein, 7 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 152, 156 (1976);
Comment, Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Im-
pact on State Laiw and the First Amendment, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 960, 969 (1975);
Comment, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: New Contours on the Libel Landscape-A
Pyrrhic Victory for Plaintiffs, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 89, 102 (1975).
62. Speaking of the "[public interest] test proposed by the Rosenbloom plur-
ality," the Supreme Court said in Gertz:
[1It would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges
to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of "general or
public interest" and which do not-to determine, in the words of MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-government." . . . We doubt the
wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges .... The "public or
general interest" test for determining the applicability of the New York Times
standard to private defamation actions inadequately serves both of the competing
values at stake. On the one hand, a private individual whose reputation is injured
[in a matter of public interest] has no recourse unless he can meet the rigorous
requirements of New York Times.... On the other hand, a publisher or broadcaster
of a defamatory error [in a matter deemed not of public interest] may be held li-
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preme Court reinforced the view that a "subject matter" limitation is
no longer an element of constitutional privilege.64 Therefore, at least
the Taskett "reasonable care" standard must be applied in any defa-
mation action brought in Washington by a private individual against a
media defendant.6 5
D. Limitation of Damages
Taskett does not signal a total victory for the "private individual"
plaintiff. Damages which may be awarded in a defamation action
against a publisher or broadcaster are subject to strict constitutional
limitations. 66 If the action succeeds upon a showing of less than "ac-
able in damages even it it took every reasonable precauti6n to ensure the ac-
curacy [of the story].
418 U.S. at 346.
Clearly, only a standard of fault less than that of New York Times, such as negligence,
which is applied without regard to the character of subject matter, can ameliorate
both dysfunctions caused by the Rosenbloom rule.
63. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). Firestone was decided one month after Taskett.
64. The Supreme Court said:
[UI se of such subject-matter classifications to determine the extent of constitutional
protection afforded defamatory falsehoods may too often result in an improper
balance between the competing interests in this area. It was our recognition and
rejection of this weakness in the Rosenbloom test which led us in Gertz to eschew
a subject-matter test for one focusing upon the character of the defamation
plaintiff.
Id. at 456.
65. A state may, of course, constitutionally grant different protections in different
situations, so long as each of the protections is at least the minimum "no liability
without fault" privilege required by Gertz. It is fully consistent with Gertz that a state
may define an "actual malice" standard where a defamation involves a private plain-
tiff in a matter of public concern, but a "negligence" standard where the defamation
does not involve a matter of public concern.
66. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 349-50, the Court held that
neither presumed nor punitive damages may be awarded upon any showing less
than "actual malice." The majority reasoned:
The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is
no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for
defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment free-
doms. Additionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish
unpopular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by
the publication of a false fact .... [T] he States have no substantial interest in
securing for plaintiffs . . . gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of
any actual injury.
Id. at 349.
Because damages are subject to constitutional limitations, the amount of a damage
award, like the determination of liability, is properly the subject of de novo appellate
review. See note 50 supra. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 460-61, discussed
at note 28 supra, the Court let stand a jury award of $100,000, although remanding
the case for a determination of liability, saying that the award was supported by com-
petent evidence. Implicit in the Court's decision, however, was a reservation that it
would, under proper circumstances, specifically re-examine such a determination.
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tual malice," a jury shall be limited to awarding damages for injuries
actually sustained. Only upon a showing of at least "actual malice"
may a jury presume damages. Under no circumstances may punitive
damages be awarded. 67
Although the Taskett opinion itself does not make clear what might
constitute "actual damages," the Washington court did address that
precise question in the subsequent case of Rasor v. Retail Credit Co. 68
Relying extensively on Gertz, it held that "actual damages" will not be
limited to out-of-pocket losses. Specific examples of harms which
might be included are impairment of reputation and standing in the
community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.69
Although awards must be supported by competent evidence, it is not
necessary to provide evidence of a specific dollar value of the injuries.
Determination of the amount of damages is left to the jury.70
III. CONCLUSION
Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co. will generally make it easier for
a private individual plaintiff to succeed in a defamation action against
a media defendant. Whether this change will result in a significantly
greater long term "chilling effect" upon the media will undoubtedly
turn upon the definition of the "reasonable care" standard which will
ultimately evolve. For the short term at least, because the new rule
is undefined and untested, it may be assumed that the media will
publish with special caution. Whatever the eventual chilling effect, it
will be mitigated by the limitation to actual damages, and by proce-
dural rules which should safeguard the fragile constitutional balance.
Allen D. Israel
67. 86 Wn. 2d at 447, 546 P.2d at 86. The rule announced in Taskett is more
restrictive in its allowance of damages than the Gertz test demands. Upon a showing
of "actual malice" the Gertz majority would allow an award of punitive damages.
418 U.S. at 349. Washington, however, does not allow punitive damages in any civil
action absent statutory authority. See, e.g., Steele v. Johnson, 76 Wn. 2d 750, 458
P.2d 889 (1969); Maki v. Aluminum Building Products, 73 Wn. 2d 23, 436 P.2d 186
(1968).
68. 87 Wn. 2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041 (1976). In Rasor, a woman who was portrayed
in a consumer credit report as having a tarnished moral reputation brought a private
action for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. That Act limits awards to
"actual damages." which the court compared to the actual damages that may be
awarded under the Gertz and Taskett holdings.
69. Id. at 529, 554 P.2d at 1049.
70. Id. at 530-31, 554 P.2d at 1050.
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